Spaghetti Regionalism or Strategic Foreign Trade: Some Evidence for Mexico by Alejandro Ibarra-Yunez
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
SPAGHETTI REGIONALISM OR STRATEGIC FOREIGN TRADE:








The author wishes to thank M. Lourdes Dieck for helpful comments on the first version of the report, and an
anonymous reviewer.The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2003 by Alejandro Ibarra-Yunez.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including ©notice, is given to the source.Spaghetti Regionalism or Strategic Foreign Trade: Some Evidence for Mexico
Alejandro Ibarra-Yunez
NBER Working Paper No. 9692
May 2003
JEL No. F1, L1
ABSTRACT
After signing ten free trade agreements between 1993 and 2001, Mexico as a world leader in foreign
trade policy continues to negotiate with countries such as Japan, Panama, Uruguay or Argentina.
Criticism of multiple regional trade agreements (RTAs) arises from a consistency test, but also from
the ability of a country to administer them. Mexico’s multiple agreements have generally used the
principle of NAFTA consistency, after the acceptance that NAFTA became a broader and deeper
accord than results of the Uruguay multilateral achievements.  An analysis of multiple RTAs is
presented, including a game model of equilibrium, along with a political economy approach of why
Mexico seeks multiple RTAs as its foreign trade policy.
Alejandro Ibarra-Yunez
Profesor Titular de Economia y Politica Publica
EGADE
ITESM-Monterrey






SPAGHETTI REGIONALISM OR STRATEGIC FOREIGN TRADE: SOME 










After signing ten free trade agreements between 1993 and 2001, Mexico as a world leader in foreign trade 
policy continues to negotiate with countries such as Japan, Panama, Uruguay or Argentina.  Criticism of 
multiple regional trade agreements (RTAs) arises from a consistency test, but also from the ability of a 
country to administer them. Mexico’s multiple agreements have generally used the principle of NAFTA 
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equilibrium, along with a political economy approach of why Mexico seeks multiple RTAs as its foreign 
trade policy. 
 
JEL classification: F1, L1 
KEY WORDS:  Mexico, RTAs, political economy, Nash equilibrium. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The World Trade Organization has accounted for 90 Regional Trade Agreements that 
have been created among its 136 member countries (formerly GATT contracting parties) 
since 1995. The figure seems impressive for the dynamism of countries in the world to 
opt for bilaterals during the past five years (WTO 2001).  Besides Europe’s activism, 
Mexico has become a world leader in signing ten RTAs from 1993 to date mainly 
because it has sought a network of bilateral accords across the world, both with 
developing countries and also with countries in the developed world. 
  What are argued reasons for this economy to generate a network of RTAs?  A first 
hypothesis is trade diversification away from increased specialization and dependency 
from the US market during the past seven years of NAFTA operation.  However, trade 
with its natural partner and the importance of Mexico’s market access in North America 
seems to continue and even deepen in the foreseeable future.   
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Moreover, trade of intra-industrial nature as has been experienced by NAFTA, has 
deepened integration among trading and investment partners in key sectors of the North 
American panorama, to increase the competitive position of the entire North American 
region that faces apparent open regionalism. 
A second line of reasoning is that Mexico’s experience with NAFTA has 
generated a learning curve effect in signing multiple RTAs, mainly Free Trade 
Agreements with other countries, where most of them contain all the issues and clauses of 
NAFTA, or what could be called NAFTA-consistency.  Aspects such as market access, 
tariffication, customs procedures, scheduling of liberalization, as well as national 
treatment/ MFN, norms, special treatment of sectors, and dispute resolution mechanisms, 
are integral part of Mexico’s negotiation and signing of RTAs.  Moreover, in some 
agreements, side accords on labor and mainly the environment have also been signed.  In 
such argument, NAFTA becomes a sellable vehicle for trade and investment 
liberalization, taken strategically or appropriated by Mexico. However, in line with this 
argument, a limit would exist set by the ability of authorities to administer multiple 
RTAs.  
A third hypothesis is that Mexico’s objectives are the political economy ones, 
where additional to trade and investment liberalization, a rationale of political 
representation of partners, mainly in Latin America and the Caribbean, is sought in other 
multilateral negotiations.  According to the World Bank (WB 1999), other political 
objectives are an increased bargaining position of members of a RTA; a strategy of 
‘being noticed’ in multilateral rules of the game; cooperation in areas of government 
policy making and among incipient multinational companies of developing countries; and 
commitment to lock-in free market policies inside economies.   
A fourth hypothesis is that additional to the learning curve effect, the political 
economy of generating a network of RTAs is that by seeking bilaterals instead of 
expanding original RTAs mainly NAFTA, Mexican authorities and economic agents, 
face economies of scale in negotiating increasing number of RTAs, or to put it in a 
different context, the cost of NAFTA expansion in political arenas among Mexico, the 
United States, and Canada, and possibly Chile, is too high both in each country’s political   3
market, and also in coordinating a regional effort.  For such a reason, it seems easier for 
one of the regional partners to seek individual RTAs.  The case that Mexico, the less 
developed of the NAFTA partners, has been the most active in signing multiple trade 
agreements could only be circumstantial, but could also imply that a race for strategic 
trade policy would stay as part of the foreign trade and investment environment in the 
foreseeable future, with all its implications and worries for trade-dependent and 
liberalizing economies. 
The present essay addresses these issues of the recent strategy by Mexico.  It also 
tries to explain whether the growing number of RTAs has negative or positive effects in 
members’ welfare functions and overall welfare, using a simple Cournot model of market 
access following Freund (2000).  The paper is organized as follows:  After briefly 
presenting evidence of Mexico’s network of RTAs and NAFTA parity, a simple stylized 
model of market access is presented that clarifies the rationale for multiple RTAs as 
building blocks toward multilateral liberalization.  In the fourth part, other economic 
considerations such as the role of rules of origin, and dispute resolution mechanisms are 
presented, that give rise to concerns on multiple trade areas.  The next part presents non-
economic reasons that could be behind government negotiators in making Mexico a 
leader in RTA networking.  The paper then presents final comments and a conclusion. 
 
MEXICO’S REGIONAL TRADE AREAS 
  Trade and investment liberalization in Mexico can be traced back to around 1985, 
when the country entered GATT and changed its development plans from import 
substitution and debt-led growth that had become non-viable, to export promotion, the so-
called National Program of Industry and Trade, and anti-inflationary measures.  Trade-led 
growth was first experienced with an undervalued currency and a recessionary domestic 
market, such that implicitly subsidized exports permitted firms to maintain capacity 
utilization and experiment the first successes in international market penetration.  After a 
new devaluation of the peso and debt renegotiation in 1987 and 1989, respectively, the 
Mexican economy underwent a period of domestic expansion with macroeconomic 
discipline and an aligned peso.  Trade (exports and imports) became the driver not only 
for overall growth but also as a means to modernize firms and sectors to access both   4
domestic and international markets, and establish price discipline in an economy that had 
experimented with high inflation rates. 
A second period of unilateral trade liberalization deepened tariffication of import 
quotas and permits, dismantled other barriers to trade (such as financing, reduction of 
subsidies, and modernization of norms), and opened up the country to increased foreign 
investment participation by 1989 (Ibarra and Stolp 1990).  Overall, the economy 
experienced massive reforms towards a free trade model of development.  The 
aforementioned period --the Salinas administration-- evolved towards the decision to 
negotiate bilateral trade agreements.  The first approach to negotiate a free trade 
agreement was between the Salinas and the Bush administrations in 1990.  The concept 
of the RTA was of an open Free Trade Agreement (FTA), where all processes were 
coherent  with GATT XXIV.  Bilaterally between Mexico and the US, the negotiated 
FTA implied the open interest by the US to expand trade, but also to support the free 
market policies of the Mexican government.  For Mexico, the main objective at that point 
was mainly to expand trade and investment, and also to improve the country’s risk 
assessment and visibility (Feinberg 1997; Andere and Kessel 1992). 
The negotiation of NAFTA began by mid 1991 and lasted until November of 
1992.  Much was followed from the US-Canadian trade deal of previous years, but 
NAFTA included aspects and procedures with more depth and extension than the US-
Canadian agreement. After passing congressional approval in 1992, side agreements on 
labor and the environment, requested by the new Clinton administration took place during 
1993, for a launch of NAFTA on January 1, 1994. The negotiation period took 26 
months, and involved government officials, advisors, industrial and commerce chambers 
under a newly formed private sector council (COECE), labor interests, and academics.  It 
was the first experience with such a unique negotiation, not only for Mexico, but also for 
the US, and for Canada (Hufbauer and Schott 1993). 
On its part, Mexico was approached by Chile that had approached the US in 
tandem.  During 1992, negotiations for an Economic Cooperation Agreement (an 
agreement that did not pretend to liberalize all sectors, such as some agricultural and 
mining products) moved Mexico and Chile towards an integral deal.  It encompassed 
some unique aspects negotiated in NAFTA, namely a dispute resolution mechanism,   5
tariff scheduling, investment liberalization, norms, and rules of origin.  The Mexico-Chile 
agreement was implemented in 1993, when the NAFTA side agreements were negotiated.  
After these two RTAs, Mexico has embarked in a network of 10 FTAs, plus other trade 
liberalization participations in diverse regions, such as APEC in Asia, and the Latin 
American Integration Association (Mexico 2001). Additional to NAFTA, agreements 
have been signed with Chile, Bolivia, Colombia-Venezuela (G3), Nicaragua, Costa Rica, 
The European Union (EU15), EFTA, Israel, and Guatemala-El Salvador-Honduras 
(Northern Triangle). In 2002 and 2003, negotiations are underway for FTAs with Japan 
and with Argentina. Negotiations began with Panama in 2000 that were then halted. 
Efforts have also been initiated between Mexico and Uruguay. 
  Mexican tariffs at implementation of RTAs vary, from a Mexican 4.9% weighted 
average inside NAFTA, to 13.4% in EU.  All bilaterals, except for G3 encompassing 
Colombia and Venezuela, are of wide scope, where minimal exceptions and bracketed 
sectors exist.  In the case of the Northern Triangle agreement, obligations of the Central 
American partners do not exist to cancel import permits and tariffication.  Lists of 
exceptions prevail in various FTAs, such as G3, all FTAs with Central American 
partners, and the EU.  Most FTAs encompass side agreements on labor and the 
environment, with exceptions in the Bolivia and Nicaragua deals.  In the case of the 
Northern Triangle, some aspects of the side-type agreements are not spelled out.  All 
FTAs also encompass foreign investment liberalization, norms, and dispute resolution 
mechanisms similar to NAFTA’s chapters 19 and 20, with somewhat lose administrative 
and procedural obligations of the Mexican partners.  Finally, in the case of the European 
Union, Mexico acquiesced on some European rules of business settlement, exceptions 
under the European agricultural policies, and a dispute settlement mechanism that is a 
mix of NAFTA and WTO.  Rules of origin and the schedule of liberalization follow 
NAFTA procedures and method of calculation, but do not necessarily converge.  In the 
case of the European Union, the trade deal was more intricate because it was the first to 
be negotiated with a group of countries under the EU umbrella, and it encompassed 
aspects that mixed NAFTA experiences with a heavy load of Community rulings.  
However, the success in such a case seemed to be to encapsulate trade and investment 
agreements, to stay separate from other political and social aspects.   6
Overall schedules of liberalization were spelled out following the NAFTA 
benchmark in most RTAs, with full liberalization generally in 10 years.  Mexico accepted 
the asymmetries in levels of development, similar to NAFTA, where de-protection has 
been substantial on Mexico’s part vis a vis other Latin American partners, that would 
move at a slower pace in their own bilateral liberalization with Mexico.  In the case of the 
EU15, full liberalization will be achieved in 8 years, with a time frame of 3 years for 
European exports to be granted NAFTA tariff parity. 
  Other agreements complete the Mexican network of RTAs.  Some like the APEC 
affiliation is of wide regional non-locked in tariff scheduling, while the rest are 
Complementation Agreements, which could become building blocks towards deep and 
wide RTAs, but the trend is not conclusive.  However, an interest has been made public 
by the new Fox administration, to further its objective in the Western Hemisphere and 
other parts of the world. As an example, complementation agreements have been signed 
in Latin America with Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay. 
  As for the volume of trade, there are arguments that RTAs with integration of 
sectors and economic activities (some of intra-industrial nature and subcontracting) are 
sometimes wrongly analyzed with respect to employment generation and displacement.  
Moreover, it is the generation of scale and scope economies, location factors, and 
deepening of production chains that international integration through trade should be 
assessed (Weintraub and Sands 1998).  In any case, trade growth is a means of welfare 
generation and economic efficiency.  With Mexico’s network of RTAs, its economy has 
become the eighth most important exporter in the world, with US$ 137 billion in 1999, 
and roughly US$ 160 billion in 2000.  The average annual rate of growth of Mexican 
exports is 14.8% between 1990 and 1999, three times faster than the rest of Latin 
America. 
  Mexico’s specialization in the North American market has increased, from around 
52% of total exports in the mid-eighties, to 71% in 1994, and 89.9% in 1999, mainly due 
to NAFTA.  Also after NAFTA, Mexico has become the third most important trade 
partner of the US, surpassing Japan in 1998.  Trade with other RTAs has changed 
unevenly, but overall FTAs have implied upward inflection points in Mexico’s trade.  For 
example, trade with the US has grown 135 % between 1994 and 2001, whereas it has   7
grown 145% with Canada (a similar pattern has been evident in Mexican imports except 
between 1995 and 1996 after the peso devaluation).  With Chile, exports grew two fold 
after its FTA in 1992, mainly in manufactures.  With Costa Rica, bilateral trade has 
grown 262% between 1995 and 2000, and the figure is a 136% growth rate in trade with 
Bolivia.  Weaker overall trade growth has been experienced with G3.  Growth stood at 
37% with Colombia and 56% between Venezuela and Mexico, respectively, from 1995 to 
2000 (Mexico 2001).   
Trade has had a gravitational characteristic, such that the highest percentage of 
Mexican trade has occurred, additional to the US, with Central America and Canada, 
leaving trade volume behind in other FTAs.  In the case of the EU15, a calculation by the 
negotiation team during 1999, projected Mexican exports to increase from the present 
US$5.2 billion in 2000, to around US$8.8 billion only in 2003, when remaining protected 
sectors will be liberalized.  With EFTA or Israel, no projected figures have been 
calculated.  In the Mexican strategy to sign a network of FTAs, little or no official contact 
was established with former trade partners, especially the US, Canada, or Chile.  Informal 
contact to share opinions however existed.  NAFTA parity as a scheme to negotiate might 
have become sufficiently sound to obviate close contact.  A similar environment has 
existed between the US and Mexico, mainly when the UK government was approached 
by American officials to explore joining NAFTA (USITC 2000). 
 
A MODEL OF TRADE FROM ALTERNATIVE RTAs 
  Tariff rates and asymmetric dynamics in reducing them in a RTA could blockade 
third country access or generate hold-up, but can also imply an attraction effect to extend 
an FTA, or the case of access of third countries. Also, superimposed RTAs could create 
trade diversion or trade suppression if diverse rules of origin exist.  
  A model of market access can be resembled by a game of production penetration, 
where rather than price competition of competing producers, market access is directly 
addressed. A second best linear Cournot model can be applied to explain effects of 
bilaterals versus addition of members to a RTA. It assumes imperfect competition, a fixed 
level of tariffs, and substitutability of competing suppliers. Although this stylized second 
best linear Cournot model cannot explain all aspects of the game of multiple RTAs, and it   8
is static, it is useful to explain the optimal number of bilaterals that a country should seek, 
and whether signing new RTAs will render welfare improvements. It also can show the 
differences between two RTAs and a new member to an incumbent bilateral.  
  As a modeling exercise, assume three countries x, y, and z, where access is made 
explicit under diverse tariff schemes.  A static representation of a Cournot game is useful 
to map equilibrium options of various tariff schemes.  Later we discuss rules of origin 
and scale economies as additional trade imperfections. 
 Let  x, y, and z be the three countries, with inverse demand functions in linear 
form, as follows: 
 
P
i (Q) = 1 – aQ
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where a is a constant, and q
i
j is quantity produced by country j for country i.  The model 
is one of access in volume, or Cournot.  The profit function for X expresses costs of 





























x      ( 2 )  
 
where c is a constant marginal cost of production, and t is a tariff faced by X in market i.  
An optimum for X over the quantity in market i, then is: 
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  Dropping the superscript i  for the destination market, if tx = ty = tz = 0, the 
solution to the three equation system is qx = qy = qz = q, which is the Cournot solution to 
an oligopoly under identical production costs. Now, moving the parameter a to the right 
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And solving for q
i
x we have: 
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Similarly for Y and Z, the solution gives: 
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For example, for country x accessing country y, its optimal Cournot quantity will 
be q
y
x = [3 - c- t 
y
z - 3t 
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x]/ 4a such that own tariff t 
y
y is zero. Similarly for the other 
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  With the above equations, one can make some intuitive comments. First, if tariffs 
to other countries are positive, domestic production increases, as shown in equation (9). If 
tariffs to third countries increase (equation 7), then sales of one country into another 
would also increase (relative tariff liberalization). 
  In a similar fashion and using the demand equation along with equation 7 and the 
system 8, total sales in country i are reduced (and prices increase) if tariffs are levied on 
other countries, hence reducing welfare, as shown by Freund (2000).  
  The government’s welfare function W of country X is the sum of the consumer 
and producer surpluses, plus the tariff revenue, as follows: 
 
  W = U(Q) – p

















z  (10) 
 
  Now under a FTA, a set of possibilities can exist:  X,Y, can form a FTA leaving Z 
out, following Yi (1996) of a coalition formation where Z’s access to one country (X) or 
both countries (XY) is impeded.  A second possibility is that after XY form a FTA, Z 
joins X in a bilateral, but stays out from Y’s access (an X hub and spoke case).  A 
modeling exercise would then be described by the simple game.  Tariffs are the 
behavioral variable to determine quantities.  At first countries apply non-zero tariffs, 
limited by the prohibitive tariff level, and let Iij be an index with a value of one if an FTA 
is formed and zero otherwise. If tariffs before an RTA are positive but similar across 




z, assuming no retaliation, or other countries’ tariffs as 
given. Hence if a country sets a positive tariff in the present exercise, it will be denoted 
by t. 
  Using equation 10 into 7 and 8, a welfare function is generated by Freund with 
combinations to show different bilateral alternatives, as follows: 
 
  W =  [(3(1 - c) – (2 - Ixy - Ixz)t)
2] / 32a + [(1 – c + (2 – Ixy – Ixz)t)
2] / 16a  
+ [(1 – c + (1 – Iyz)t – 3((1 – Ixy)t)
2] / 16a  
+ [(1 – c + (1 – Iyz)t – 3(1 – Ixz)t)
2] / 16a  
+ (2 – Ixy – Ixz)t[ 1 – c – (2 + Ixy + Ixz)t]  /  4a      (11) 
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  The first term is the consumer surplus (CS).  Note that indexes of RTAs exist such 
that if X signs an FTA with Y, but not with Z, the tariff rate directly reduces CS.  If two 
FTAs are signed which are symmetrical then CS is larger than with no FTAs due to 
formerly setting tariffs for countries Y and Z in autarky.  The second term stands for 
profits of firms in the home market, where if two FTAs are signed, a competitive effect, 
as spelled out by Baldwin and Venables (1995), reduces profits as new firms enter the 
extended market.  The above competitive effect in quantities, does not account for the 
status quo of market structures ex ante integration, or the change in market structure as 
the result of entry ex post a FTA implementation.  This will be explained in the following 
section.  The third and fourth terms represent country X’s profits in the Y, and Z markets, 
respectively.  The final fifth term is tariff revenue. 
  In the above equation, one can observe the game of reciprocal interaction typical 
of industrial organization models, and of best response functions followed by a unique 
Nash equilibrium (Tirole 1995).  Indeed, any decision:  no FTAs; XY| Z or XZ|Y 
(symmetry with one FTA); XY+XZ (two FTAs); or an FTA among the three countries 
XYZ, all imply effects in the five terms spelled out above.  Mexico has produced one-on-
one multiple FTAs.  Note that the model only represents the access effect, since it 
concentrates only on quantities in this stylized static Cournot model. 
  Again relying on Freund (2000), let us look at the Mexican theoretical results. 
  First, if countries do not join a RTA, Ixy, Ixz  are zero, for which the optimal tariff 
is the same as shown above, depending on the cost level c.  Welfare improvement is then 
zero.  However, welfare clearly improves if X signs one FTA, and increases even further 
if X signs two FTAs, where Y and Z do not have a coalition or Iyz = 0.  This is shown as 
follows, simplifying for subscripts: 
 
W =  [t 6 (1 – c) – 7t] / 32a with one partner, versus 
W = [t12 (1 – c) + 8t] /32a with two partners that do not have coalitions among them 
 
  Extending the above to many countries i, j, there will be multiple bilaterals or (n-
1) combinations, as the unique Nash equilibrium in market access as tariffs are 
dismantled, or a move towards multilateralism.   12
  Now, if Y and Z already have a RTA, X will be better off signing both one 
bilateral or two bilaterals (where Iyz = 1).  Country X welfare will be 
 
W =  - t[ 2(1 – c) – t] /32a with one FTA given YZ’s bilateral, versus 
W = t[ 4(1 – c) + 4t] /32a with two FTAs 
 
  Again, country X will be drawn to two bilaterals, as a unique Cournot Nash 
equilibrium.  Note that under the present simple model, welfare clearly improves, by 
having profits abroad, and the domestic consumer surplus (market access and 
consumption) outweighs the loss in tariff revenue and domestic profit reduction through 
more competition and lower domestic output. 
  Mexico, in its network of FTAs, might be analyzed under this logic, of extending 
the market for goods and services and promoting growth in partners’ firms’ profits, even 
by losing domestic profits and tariff revenue.  The same would occur for other new 
Mexican partners that have been drawn by the Mexican experience with NAFTA.  Now, 
if tariff revenue is a small percentage of government income, this negative effect along 
with more competition, credibly could be assumed smaller than increased consumer 
surplus and profits in/ of other markets.  Such a finding was presented by Bachrach and 
Mizrahi (1992), and by Brown, Deardorf, and Stern (1992), but would be an empirical 
question. 
One aspect that emanates from the model above, but seems to be absent from the 
Mexican government logic of multiple FTAs is that new bilaterals or expansion, affect all 
parts of the welfare equation.  For example, a new FTA will have new effects in reducing 
domestic profits and tariff revenue, to be counterbalanced by new market access and 
consumer surplus.  Such an effect could make a limit to networking. 
Now, what about moving from multiple FTAs towards unifying them in one bloc 
of, say Latin American partners?  If one compares the second welfare functions presented 
above in the two possible combinations (X joins Y, and Z, versus X,Y,Z form a 
coalition), then the expansion XYZ clearly dominates the network XY and XZ.  Why is it 
that Mexico has sought the less than paretian equilibrium?  Some other economic 
explanations have to be sought.    13
 
OTHER ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS  
  The Cournot model presented above, cannot account for the dynamics of RTAs. 
An extension to some of the key behavioral and strategic aspects of trade liberalization is 
presented in this section. A generalized worry is that a RTA of the FTA form may lead to 
lobbying for protection by members of an agreement, against granting MFN treatment to 
non-members.  In the case of a network of FTAs, deviations from homogeneous tariff and 
non-tariff reductions across agreements, could be welfare reducing both within blocs and 
outside them, as many studies of ‘endogenous protection’ try to show (Grossman and 
Helpman 1995; Krishna 1998; Panagariya and Findlay 1996).  However, the evidence of 
studies is non-conclusive.  Wei and Frankel (1996), for example, show that a RTA can 
move towards multilateralism by dividing previous opposition forces, whereas Cadot, de 
Melo, and Olarreaga (1998) stress the usefulness of FTAs when rules of origin are clear 
and open, and losers are compensated from trade liberalization.  Moreover, 
Adriamananjara (2000) concludes that excluded countries also move strategically.  They 
could become more protectionist, but if a RTA undertakes MFN liberalizations to 
counteract the reaction, then excluded countries move towards de-protection.  The logic 
of ‘divide-conquer-and draw closer,’ would be a reason for Mexico’s preference for 
multiple FTAs instead of expansion even if the latter would imply low costs. 
  Some other key aspects of liberalization --economic reasons—could be extended 
from the stylized model presented above.  First, if the cost functions are adjusted to the 
existence of economies of scale, then the profits domestically would not always decline 
as shown in the model, and market access abroad would increase even further from the 
results of the equations.  Welfare could improve in the Cournot model, since the Nash 
equilibrium would render higher than monopoly quantities at less than monopoly prices.  
However, the existence of economies of scale would have two negative effects:  sunk 
costs as barriers to entry, and increasing lobbying by ‘national champions’ of a trade 
agreement, to be selectively protected.  For Smith and Venables (1988), these effects 
should be weighed against efficiency gains through cost reductions and rationalization of 
location.     14
The evidence from developed countries is non-conclusive.  What seems to be 
apparent is that economies of scale will generate a sort of duality in the production base, 
where ‘national champions’ will increasingly integrate both in homogeneous products or 
what can be taken as intra-industrial trade growth, and also in differentiated products.  
Now, for differentiated products, the modeled demand equations should include a 
differentiation parameter, which would make the model more complex, but that would 
not affect the theoretical logic.  Turning now to experiences in the trade front, main 
Mexican trade products with the US, with Canada, with Chile, and with Venezuela are of 
the intra-industrial nature.  A policy worry by both Mexican and US authorities is how to 
extend the benefits of NAFTA and other FTAs by Mexico, to disintegrated sectors and 
firms, and whether compensation policies should be undertaken.  That seems to also be 
the case, when negotiation was underway between Mexico and Nicaragua, Mexico-
Bolivia, and Mexico- Northern Triangle countries.  In those FTAs, restrictions to specific 
sectors meant some deviations from NAFTA parity. 
  Another key aspect not considered in the stylized model is the case of rules of 
origin.  Rules of origin determine the nationality or regionality of a product to be subject 
to preferential tariff rates within a FTA.  Rules of origin are also fundamental for 
determining quotas or anti-dumping measures.  However, they can serve as a 
protectionist device, mainly by excluding products originated in non-members, even if 
they are transformed in a member country.  In short, sufficient transformation becomes a 
cumbersome and subjective measure that could become discriminatory that is not 
presented in the model.  The preferential tariff rate would be plugged into the above 
equations.  However, if different rules of origin exist across the various FTAs because a 
country such as Mexico has dealt with diverse countries in their levels of development, 
then trade diversion away from the higher preferential trade partner and into the lower 
tariffied partner would result.  Then asymmetries would exist across the network of 
FTAs, to affect the results. 
  Asymmetric equilibrium would not be a problem if all partners face negotiation of 
RTAs with ex ante low tariffs.  For example, using a data set from the World Bank and 
WTO (2001), countries with which Mexico has signed FTAs show varied levels of MFN 
tariffs immediately previous to FTA implementation, that range from 12.8 for Venezuela   15
(weighted) in 1995, to 4.1% in the US in 1993.  Other weighted tariff rates at the time of 
FTA implementation were moderate in Colombia (12%), Bolivia (9.8%), Chile (10.9%), 
and El Salvador (8.5%), to low in Canada (6.8% in 1993), Guatemala and Honduras 
(5.7%), Costa Rica (4.3%), and the United States and Nicaragua (4.1%).  In FTAs such as 
NAFTA, rates have diminished as opposed to MFN tariff rates to the rest of the world.  
The same has occurred for Chile, and the EU15.  Less dynamic tariff dismantling was 
signed with Bolivia, the G3, and the Northern Triangle of countries.  For Costa Rica, 
tariff reduction has occurred in this economy bilaterally and with the rest of the world.  In 
the case of Mexico, its weighted average tariff stayed at 11.8% in 1995, but has 
diminished to 4.1% in 1999 and is lower with NAFTA partners.  This means that Mexico 
would show the largest difference between its MFN tariff rates and those of its multiple 
Free Trade Agreements.  One has to pinpoint that given its trade dependency with the US, 
the Mexican’s rest of the world average tariff rate shows a 16.2% in 2000 (non-
weighted), according to IADB (2001).  For those cases where ex ante tariffs were low, 
there is overall little suspicion of trade diversion.  For the case of G3 and Bolivia, some 
diversion might have occurred, depending on tariff rates and also the accounting of rules 
of origin.  For the Chile FTA, complementarities in tariff dismantling, and the deep 
NAFTA parity status, would make one infer little diversion.  The case with the EU15 is 
complex because of exceptions.  However, its ex ante tariff rates are low. 
  Rules of origin affect the welfare functions depicted above, and transmit 
themselves through demand functions, costs, and even the preferential tariff rates, 
reducing the welfare improvement through trade diversion, but also via consumption and 
the very pattern of trade.  They also reduce the effectiveness to administer a network of 
FTAs by Mexico, that makes it a cumbersome management and sets a limit to the 
network of FTAs. In part this reason is argued that the Mexican strategy could be second 
best, even if the FTAs are NAFTA compatible.  However, the alternative to have a 
compact overall set of rules of origin for the entire Hemisphere seems implausible at 
present, additional to the fact that the asymmetric levels of development will not decline 
to converge on rules of origin. 
  A final additional economic argument for RTAs is the creation of knowledge 
capital and investment flows when bilaterals emerge.  The agglomeration, knowledge   16
creation-specialization, and investment flows, seem to be welfare improving even in the 
case of trade diversion and asymmetric distribution of gains from bilateral trade.  The 
point has provoked a good set of analytical studies, but has concentrated on the gains 
from these additional virtuous effects in the less developed area of a RTA.  If we follow 
the approach by Holstrom and Kokko (1997) of contract extension and knowledge 
specialization, then a network of FTAs beginning with the Mexico-US-Canada NAFTA, 
would have provoked capital and knowledge creation effects into Mexico, to then be 
transmitted through the other FTAs mainly with Latin American partners, or a case of 
capital dissemination.  It is not clear how that would operate in the Mexico-EU15 FTA, 
for example, and other pending agreements.  In any case, a study by Ibarra (1998) shows 
a surge from emerging Mexican multinational corporations, moving part of operations 
not only to the US border states, but also to other Latin American countries, a signal of 
complementarities between trade and investment.  The signal is only indicative, because 
data quality and sources are rather imperfect. 
  How has Mexico approached the process, scope, and framework for its 10 FTAs?  
As was already emphasized, The Mexican approach has been to seek NAFTA parity in all 
negotiations.  In all cases of negotiating FTAs, experience developed in the first ones by 
authorities and private sector advisors, has continued to be applied in similar formats of 
negotiation, in the formation of the same negotiating groups and their objectives, and 
with NAFTA rulings at hand.  In all negotiation cases, the following expert groups have 
been active:  Market Access; Origin and Customs Procedures; Technical and Phyto-
sanitary Norms; Agriculture; Government Procurement; Services; Intellectual Property; 
Investment; Dispute Settlement; and Illegal Trade Practices.  Given different types of 
partners, the liberalization processes by products and characteristics of rules of origin 
have not been homogeneous.  There are no known studies of the bilateral or regional 
effects on trade diversion, consumer and market expansion, cost efficiency, scale 
economies, profitability, and government revenue mix.  Hence the results of the model 
above would depend on the impact on a, c, t, and q. 
 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RTAs   17
  Economic studies of RTAs and specifically of Mexico have concentrated in 
economic impacts of bilateral trade and investment agreements.  Some have used a 
sectoral descriptive/analytical approach (Andere and Kessel 1992; Garber 1993; 
Hufbauer and Schott 1995).  Others have followed partial equilibrium models or 
generalizable computational equilibrium ones (Bachrach and Mizrahi 1992; Brown, 
Deardorf, and Stern 1992; or Roland-Horst, Reinert, and Shiells 1992).  From the 
political economy side, important studies have been created by Weintraub (1995), and 
much more recently by institutions such as the USITC (See Adriamananjara 1999, 2000; 
World Bank 2000; and others such a DeRosa 1988; or position papers by Huenemann 
2001).  For the present paper, this author interviewed key Mexican officials from the 
Under Secretariat of International Trade Negotiations, to find that little or no focused 
agreement exists that stresses political reasons for seeking a multiplicity of FTAs by 
Mexico. 
  Main non-economic reasons emphasized by a special study on RTAs (World 
Bank 2000) have been observed to be the following:  Security; Bargaining improvements; 
Being noticed; Policy Coordination; and Policy lock-in.  An additional one is conflict 
evasion with original partners as a reason behind multiple bilaterals.  Finally, there is the 
question of limits of bilateral agreements that could push the agenda towards unifying 
them under a potential Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). 
  Security, as a policy choice, was quite a forceful argument when the EU was 
formed in 1951.  Some argumentation also existed between Brazil and Argentina while 
planning to form MERCOSUR.  By increasing trade, intra-regional conflict would 
decline.  For Mexico, however, not such a reasoning existed in the open during NAFTA 
negotiations, or negotiations with the rest of its RTAs.  NAFTA has indeed increased 
government contact at all levels, between Mexico, Canada, and the US.  But it has not 
necessarily meant conflict reduction in such areas as the environment, labor aspects, or 
other issues that are important in the partnership but were not part of the trade deal, such 
as drugs and migration.  It is interesting to see that the new Mexican administration is 
seeking a different approach to cooperation in labor migration, drug trafficking, and 
judicial coordination with its Northern partners, as well as the emerging approach to 
contacts in MERCOSUR.  Within Mexico, however, the asymmetries in modernization   18
by regions, has caused more rather than less political conflict.  The case between of 
Honduras and El Salvador also deserves mention.  Even if they are part of the Northern 
Triangle (along with Guatemala), as defined by Mexico’s FTA with them in Central 
America, they are recently developing a sense of mistrust as partners, because of better 
credit markets and liquidity in El Salvador, its move towards dollarization, and trade 
gains distributed unevenly between them. 
  On the topic of increased bargaining power of members of a RTA with respect to 
multilateral agencies or third countries, the set of interviews with Mexican government 
officials showed that there is not an open rationale to pursue the network of FTAs on 
grounds of Mexico leading the way as a political representative.  Given this argument, 
Mexico would extend its powers more broadly if it represents a set of partners instead of 
being part of an overall hemispheric area.  Indeed, the learning curve that Mexico has 
developed after NAFTA has made analysts become aware of an international political 
power.  Whether such a power is concentrated in the trade and investment areas, or would 
extend towards other issues such as political power of the regions, or active 
representation before multilateral or US stances is yet to be observed.  Inside Mexico, 
there is however one issue that has created divergent approaches to the world.  During the 
transition period towards the inauguration of the Fox administration, a discussion was 
generated whether the ministry of foreign relations (in charge of foreign diplomacy), or 
the secretary of the economy (the new name for the former Trade and Industrial 
Promotion Secretary SECOFI), should be in charge of foreign economic policy.  It seems 
that the discussion was settled in favor of the Secretary of the Economy, where economic 
reasons would precede foreign policy ones, in relation with Mexico’s strategy to expand 
and deepen its RTAs.  So the bargaining power reason to pursue a political agenda is not 
yet evident, even when a new round of multilateral negotiations begins.  The above also 
relates to the political argument of ‘being noticed’ internationally, except for the 
increasing attractiveness of the Western Hemisphere for trade and investment. 
  Two other political economy reasons might be more clearly present in Mexico’s 
quest for multiple RTAs:  Cooperation, and policy lock-in.  On cooperation in managing 
of shared conflicts, resources, and large projects, very little success has characterized 
Latin America, and overall so-called North- South cooperation.  Part of the reason is the   19
historical tendency to put all economic and political aspects under the umbrella of signed 
accords (the LAFTA negative experience during the eighties is a dramatic example).  
Another reason is that cooperation requires the sharing of the financial and legal costs 
between partners.  Given stark economic and legal asymmetries, political cooperation has 
only been a marginal idea by Mexican government officials.  However, there have been 
successful examples of political and social cooperation that have surged out of Mexico’s 
FTAs but were not planned within the realm of trade and investment deals.  For example, 
in the case of the Mexico-EU15 FTA, financial cooperation to lagging regions and 
sectors, as well as cooperation in sharing administrative competence in fiscal, judicial, 
and financial support to small and medium sized firms was at least discussed deeply 
during negotiations.  Administrative coordination and international benchmarking of 
government policy decisions is another element of this argument that would impel 
authorities to prefer a multiplicity of RTAs in favor of extension of existing ones, mainly 
because political power would stay with the coordinating agency instead of a trans-
national commission or secretariat. 
Whether regulatory change in areas related to international liberalization is more 
effective and transparent than regulations applied to domestic economic issues is a non-
conclusive question that has raised increasing attention by academics, but not by 
authorities in Mexico.  Specifically, a litigious environment exists in international trade in 
services, such as telecommunications and energy, where regulations to sectors have 
provoked vocal criticism by authorities in the US, of not compliance to generally 
accepted regulations in the US viewpoint.  But bilaterally dealing with the issue seems 
preferable to authorities than facing a multilateral litigation, as has been evidenced by 
Mexico’s telecommunications regulator. 
  Another complementary reason to extend integration via various RTAs has been 
policy reform commitments, or what is called locking-in.  Many aspects of NAFTA and 
its strategic extension encompass institutional and regulatory commitments and 
impediments to reversing open economic policies.  Now, some officials and business 
interests have expressed openly that a precondition for FTAs has been pre-commitments 
by partner governments to maintain a free trade, open capitalism scheme.  Some other 
commitments have been inserted in the trade agreements, whereas a third set of   20
commitment mechanisms are more self enforcing and depending upon the expected gains 
for players in the political game of trade liberalization.  Following the game theoretic 
logic expressed in the stylized model, pre-commitments can work if a mechanism of out-
of-FTA incentives exists, from partnering governments or multilateral institutions.  Some 
other elements have also been deepened.  For example, government procurement and 
licensing have been modernized; customs procedures and certificates of origin are now 
transparent and easy to grant; and expropriation has been non-existent (obviously other 
aspects are more heated, such as trucking, environmental regulations, and 
telecommunication services as described above). 
Pre-commitments by other partners with which Mexico maintains less trade and 
investment flows are somewhat more diffuse.  Any pre-commitment needs auditing, 
which in being costly, could make the political objective of a RTA less cementing.  As a 
result, free riding on a RTA or violations could emerge.  To date, the older FTAs, those 
with Chile, the G3 one, and the one with Bolivia, have seen little or no evidence of free 
riding, or that free riding is ineffectual.  For this precise reason, the negotiation with the 
Northern Triangle countries, in being a larger natural market for Mexican interests, 
moved more litigious.  The same has occurred with the US, but not with Canada. Pre-
commitments in short, seem to be evident the more trade and investment importance 
exists between partners. 
  Following the other channel of lock-in policy objectives, that of making them part 
of the FTA, one can give credence to negotiation under NAFTA parity, which at the same 
time is WTO consistent with all its non-discriminatory commitments in the areas of 
scheduling of tariff liberalization; tariffication; minimal negative lists; NT/MFN rules of 
origin; norms and standards; and dispute resolution mechanisms.  A strategy depending 
of the learning curve argument, then reinforces itself with the argument of policy lock-in, 
to be similar across Mexican partners as a step towards wider regionalism and 
multilateralism, but cannot make sense of either seeking multiple FTAs or FTA 
extension.  Less clear are explicit aspects in FTAs on services, government procurement, 
agricultural subsidies, and the rest of issues affecting bilateral relations.  For example, 
Huenemann (2000) has expressed worry that NAFTA pending issues have become low 
priority in the political economic dialogue between the US and Mexico, and that NAFTA   21
has moved to ‘automatic pilot.’  Lock-in policies to be generalizable from inside the text 
and implementation of an FTA, then seem to be useful by using the aforementioned 
NAFTA parity, but are not necessarily binding and credible.  Moreover, in being diffuse 
by Mexico’s network of FTAs, commitment policies across partners become more 
difficult to observe than if NAFTA extension had been successful. 
Let us refer briefly to NAFTA compatibility in dispute settlement, spelled out in 
NAFTA Ch. 19 on antidumping, and 20 on institutions and administrative procedures for 
dispute resolution.  In all ten FTAs, plus the deal with Uruguay, Mexico sought a lock-in 
procedure for analysis, valuation, measurement of effects and causality, and punishments.  
For the case of countervailing measures, various institutional settings are spelled out, but 
are not entirely committed under the clauses.  In the case of administrative procedures, 
mainly the formation of procedural agencies in charge of cases, as well as compulsory 
panels when disputes are stalled, vary in their legal force, their timing, and their 
transparency of adjudication.  For this reason, hidden actions or information, can give rise 
to opportunistic tactics among partners.  All FTAs include a clause similar to Chapter 19, 
and some but not all, specify procedural aspects (Chapter 20).  For example, the Mexico-
Bolivia FTA does not include obligatory procedures; the one between Mexico and the G3 
defines an alternative way arising from the Treaty of Cartagena; the Mexico-EU deal and 
the one with EFTA, Nicaragua, the Northern Triangle, and Costa Rica, follow lines of 
procedure under WTO Marrakech treaty.  The next step towards a FTAA would not 
necessarily resolve the variety of in-clause commitments, or would be easier to come 
about free riding problems. 
  Finally, policy commitment could arise, not because there is a credible signal 
before a RTA is signed, neither because aspects of commitment are spelled out as a 
contract in specific FTAs, but through self enforcing mechanisms and as the result of 
gains by economic interests in partner countries.  For example, a pre-commitment with 
democracy (such as the one precondition established two years before Mexico begun 
negotiations with the EU), could be violated if losers from an FTA have market power or 
can lobby authorities for special protection, or exert political power.  If a regional 
agreement makes a country heavily dependent on trade and investment liberalization, and 
domestic policy adjustment is visible to the populace as a complementary modernization   22
with benefits to everyone, then violating the RTA or deviating from its objectives, could 
render heavy punishments from abroad (country risk degradation, boycott), or inside the 
country.  But if the effects are concentrated, lock-in policies would not be guaranteed.  In 
short, integration through RTAs would press for lock-in policies if the importance of 
cross integration increases and benefits are widespread or evident for involved agents. 
  Are there differences between signing a network of individual FTAs and 
cementing them into a few RTAs with increasing members?  Mexico has followed the 
first route.  It has become a leader in Latin America and elsewhere in signing ten FTAs, 
plus the ones that will develop in the foreseeable future.  The model shows that extension 
to more countries, rather than extension via multiple FTAs would be welfare enhancing.  
There are only two reasons for which Mexico has followed an apparent spaghetti of 
FTAs:  It either puts a heavy weight in domestic profit decline due to extended FTA 
members, or it has used the political economy visibility and lock-in argument step by step 
with a strategic view. 
A last argument to seek multiple FTAs instead of FTA expansion is the case of an 
easier and less costly negotiation when coordination among former partners is 
troublesome.  Mexico has sought deals in Latin America after 1995 with little or no 
coordination with the US, Canada, Chile and only with a political paradigm of NAFTA 
parity as discussed above.  Moreover, if criticism of the FTA continues in various levels 
of the political front, then authorities in Mexico have sought the easiest way towards 
bilateral liberalizations, even with their efficiency costs. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
  Can one say that NAFTA is a success to the point of becoming the model for 
integrating the hemisphere?  Mexico has sought NAFTA parity in its ten FTAs, both in 
Latin America, but also in Europe, and possibly with Japan in the foreseeable future.  
What does the analysis of such a strategy show:  A spaghetti regionalism or a strategic 
move towards becoming leader of hemispheric and multilateral integration? 
  It has been argued that welfare improves by increasing membership into a RTA, if 
the competitive effect and consumer surplus, outweigh government revenue loss and 
decline in profits.  In the case of economies of scale, cost reduction and rationalization   23
minimizes profit loss of domestic interests and makes the results of either multiple RTAs 
or extension of a RTA non-conclusive.  Finally, political economy reasons mainly are 
apparent in lock-in and administration of bilaterals, but not necessarily in cooperation, 
bargaining, or visibility in policy making.  The reasoning for the network of ten FTAs by 
Mexico, is that NAFTA parity has been useful and does necessarily make the so-called 
spaghetti regionalism less a concern than generally advocated, except for disputes that 
can give rise to free riding.  However, commitment is shown not only to depend from the 
clauses and obligations set forth by a new FTA, but from endogenous commitment if 
players gain from a deal, as well as an overall pre-commitment by governments, if a 
strong underlying paradigm of integration emerges, and punishments are enforceable. 
Finally, the model shows that the effects on production, profits, and market access under 
the various alternatives, depend on the partner characteristics. Then a question would be 
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